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ABSTRACT
Nauruans’ experiences of a resource curse from 
mining phosphate stands, as a case study of retarded 
development. Nauru was much adulated in the press 
in the early XXth century as an example of a «small 
island» that became «wealthy» through mining. he 
high grade phosphate that covered four ifths of the 
island was considered by outsiders as a very lucrative 
resource that had to be mined, particularly as fertilizer 
to enhance the pastures of Australia and New Zealand. 
he development of Nauru has been misinterpreted by 
attributions of wealth to Nauruans when most of the 
proits from mining accrued to the mining agencies. 
Sales of phosphate yielded far greater development to 
Australian agriculture than to Nauruan owners of the 
resource. Meanwhile the small island surface of Nauru 
underwent gradual destruction of its interior retarding 
any developments, economic or humanitarian.
Keywords: Nauru, phosphate mining, resource 
curse, retarded development, case study
RÉSUMÉ
L’expérience nauruane des ressources maudites découlant 
de l’exploitation du phosphate constitue un cas embléma-
tique de prévention du développement. Nauru a été acclamé 
dans la presse du début du XXe siècle comme un exemple 
de « petites îles » devenue « riches » grâce à l’exploitation 
minière. Le minerai à haute teneur en phosphate qui 
couvrait les quatre cinquièmes de l’île était considéré dans 
le reste du monde comme une ressource lucrative à extraire, 
en particulier pour fertiliser les prairies australiennes et néo-
zélandaises. Le développement de Nauru a mal été inter-
prété, sur la base des richesses distribuées aux habitants, 
alors que l’essentiel des proits miniers revenait en réalité aux 
opérateurs miniers. Le commerce du phosphate a rapporté 
beaucoup plus à l’agriculture australienne qu’aux proprié-
taires nauruans de la ressource en question. Et cet enri-
chissement très relatif a eu pour conséquence la destruction 
progressive de la surface de la petite île de Nauru, empêchant 
tout développement, qu’il soit économique ou humain.
Mots-clés : Nauru, exploitation du phosphate, malédic-
tion des ressources, frein au développement, étude de cas 
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Nauru phosphate mining is a prime example of 
«the natural resource curse» thesis (Auty, 1993) 
as applied to a small island state in the Paciic. 
Mining did not enhance economic development 
for Nauruans but rather retarded Nauruan 
development processes, betraying trusts and 
creating reliance on outside agencies, so necessary 
for a small population on a single island in mid-
Paciic. Mining has had a long term impact on 
Nauruans and their island (Pollock, 2014). his 
paper illustrates what Rosser (2006) terms the 
consensus of how «political and social variables 
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he media has labelled Nauruans variously 
over time as: 
«the wealthiest little island in the Paciic […], most 
“obese population” on who list of bmis, and “failed 
state”.»
In this paper we examine how Nauruans have 
experienced little beneits from «wealth» from 
phosphate during the xxth century, but rather 
inherited a struggle to seek the lost income, 
buried in Trusts by the bpc. he small income 
that each Nauruan land holder received at the 
time her/his piece of land was mined contributed 
minimally to that family’s welfare. And the Trust 
Funds have contributed little to Nauruans’ 
future security, as discussed below. he lack of 
rehabilitation of the devastated four ifths of the 
interior of the island lingers as a humanitarian 
(and costly) issue that requires vast capitalist 
resources to render the whole island habitable 
again, in order to meet Nauruans’ hopes for 
future generations. Nauruans’ trust in outsiders’ 
lack of attention to these concerns has been 
severely compromised.
When economic development is measured 
in terms of the growth of «wealth» and how 
that wealth is managed (e.g. Stiglitz, 2006) 
the Nauruan example reveals contrasting views 
of that concept. For Nauruans, wealth has 
always referred to their island, their land, in 
its spiritual and material entirety, deep down 
below any surface elements. hat was the basis 
from which Nauruans instituted their claim 
for compensation from the British Phosphate 
Commissioners (Weeramantry, 1992; Pollock, 
1986). For the Paciic Phosphate Company 
at the beginning of the xxth century and later 
the British Phosphate Commissioners, wealth 
was viewed as returns accumulating to their 
businesses from phosphate sold at cheap prices 
to themselves. For one party, Nauruans, their 
wealth has been destroyed by mining; for the 
other, Australia and New Zealand, wealth was 
created. hese contrasting views of «wealth» 
underlie the early misrepresentations of Nauru 
as a wealthy nation.
By tracing the impact of mining phosphate 
on a small remote Paciic island, we can clarify 
how economic development has tended to be 
slower in resource rich countries than in rich 
nations (Auty, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 2001; 
Stiglitz, 2006). Most of the mining examples 
cited by Sachs and Warner are enclaves within 
larger economic entities that have been classed 
as developing nations, such as tin mining in 
Chile. hey are also entities where mining has 
developed recently, i.e. in the last 50 years. In 
contrast, Nauruans have experienced the «under-
developments» resultant from mining throughout 
the xxth century (Pollock, 2014). he «natural 
mediate the relationship between natural resource 
wealth and development outcomes» in one small 
Paciic Island nation. he so-called wealth that 
has drawn much media attention has disrupted 
political relationships within and exterior to the 
island, and led to a loss of wealth, both inancial, 
environmental and social. his society thus 
exempliies the label «natural resource curse». 
Nauruans had to seek compensation from the 
British Phosphate Commissioners (bpc) for 
failure to rehabilitate environmental destruction, 
that led to loss of land as the main food source, 
and loss of administrative control of their own 
afairs, i.e. autonomy. hey received miniscule 
beneits from the extraction and sales of «their» 
phosphate, and violation of international trusts 
that committed bpc to bringing development to 
Nauru society (Weeramantry, 1992). 
We will consider the Nauruan case of mining 
as «retarded development» by contrasting 
capitalist views of economic development, i.e. 
cash dependency, with humanitarian views 
of development, i.e. of justice and well-being 
(Sen, 2001). Whereas minute cash returns to 
a few Nauruans necessitated purchases of basic 
foods to replace traditional foods, the additional 
sums deducted by Australian administrators to 
be placed in Trust Funds, and environmental 
degradation left Nauruans struggling to survive 
on their much reduced island space. Nauruans’ 
humanitarian concerns were compromised by 
their loss of autonomy in the face of mining 
priorities. Nauruans’ call for rehabilitation of their 
island and compensation for under payments for 
their phosphate was heard at the International 
Court of Justice in the Hague, with former British 
Phosphate Commissioners charged with remedial 
payments (see Weeramantry, 1992 for details).
he Commission of Enquiry into Worked 
Out Mines on Nauru (1986-1988), as a joint 
project between the Nauruan government and 
AusAid, sought to establish the background to 
Nauruans’ concerns for remedying the damage 
to their island inlicted by phosphate mining. 
he Commission of Enquiry brought in a team 
of advisers ranging from geo-morphologists to a 
housing advisor and ecological remedial advisers. 
My role as social scientist liased with the former 
President Lagi Harris to ascertain the views of 
Nauruans about the best steps for their future. 
We held meetings in the twelve districts, talked 
with concerned Nauruans, and I visited a Class 6 
to discuss and have them illustrate their thoughts 
on their future. As an anthropologist I was 
concerned that the team capture Nauruans’ views 
of the best remedies for their island’s well-being.
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including food and water, that must 
be transported across many thousand 
miles of the Paciic Ocean.
Socio-Cultural Background to 
Mining
When mining began in 1906, the 
Nauruan population was less than 
1,000 people. A civil war in the 
1880s, fuelled by traders, mainly 
German, selling guns and gin, led 
to the «Queen» of all Nauruan tribes 
approaching Germany for assistance 
to bring peace to what had been 
labelled by earlier visitors as «pleasant 
island». As a German colony, tribal 
organization was reformulated for 
administrative purposes (see Clark and 
Firth 1992), but Nauruans continued 
to maintain their traditional structure 
of leadership of tribes, districts and 
family mobility of allegiances. Tribal 
organization was further reviewed 
in 1927 when the British Phosphate 
Commissioners introduced a new 
Council of Chiefs through which to 
administer both Nauruan social relationships 
and mining the land. Nauruans maintained 
their tribal structure alongside the new imposed 
political structure. In 1952, Nauruans established 
a less hierarchical structure for themselves in the 
form of the Nauru Local Government Council. 
Importantly, it gave them a separate voice to the 
United Nations Visiting Missions to whom they 
expressed their growing list of concerns.
he onset of mining in 1906 drew Nauruans 
into a transitional status. heir traditional 
tribal organisation, social hierarchy and 
supporting customs and practices provided the 
fundamental basis for their living and well-
being. Each Nauruan belonged to the tribe of 
her or his mother. S/he was also born into a two-
tiered social system, headed by the Temonibe 
class, with younger kinsmen belonging to the 
Amengename class. Newcomers comprised the 
Itsio class who became attached as residents 
and workers to a particular tribal chief who 
conferred on them rights to live on and work 
on a particular land. he Nauruan social system 
was clearly established; it enabled outsiders such 
as beachcombers and traders to be given a place 
in the system, albeit as outsiders (itsio). he 
Nauruan social system revolved around women 
as the procreators of new members of each of 
the twelve tribes, and some were recognised as 
chiefs. he tribal system has survived the turmoil 
of the xxth century (Pollock, 2014).
resource curse» has left them with little land to 
live on, no local resources, limited inances, and 
a high level of dependency on outside agencies. 
hey must import all necessities, including food 
and water, using whatever returns their resource 
has provided throughout the xxth century. Today 
they have become dependent on outside aid to 
replace their denuded island’s wealth.
he Nauru example demonstrates the negative 
aspects of dependence on cash as an element 
of capitalism. When returns from the sale of a 
resource, in this case phosphate, must replace 
basic subsistence living sources, and when cash 
returns are miniscule (two pence a ton) to a land 
holder for a piece of land mined, new problems 
are presented for everyday living and well-being. 
In the short term few Nauruans have had cash 
to meet new demands. In the long term the 
Trust Funds, derived from money taken from 
those small sums to be set aside/invested by 
the Administrators for Nauruans’ future needs, 
have proved to be poorly invested. he gradual 
destruction of the whole interior of the island 
has had both short term and long term impacts 
that Nauruans themselves have had to address. 
he result, in the xxist century is an island 
population crowded into a narrow shore-line 
strip totally dependent on outside sources, 
Map 1. – Nauru in the Paciic Ocean
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continued to be supported, whereas in other 
parts of the Paciic, plans to restrict population 
growth have been set in place. At the turn of the 
xixth century Nauruans had established a target 
of 1,500 both as a necessary feature for retaining 
autonomy on their island, as well as for gaining 
recognition by their administrators. Contract 
labourers brought in in large numbers from 
1906 onward placed Nauruans in third place 
behind the administration and mining managers 
and an ever-growing labour force. Development 
was curtailed by their low numbers, as it was 
dispersed amongst all residents.
hat target population goal of 1,500 (Kretz-
schmar, 1913) was inally reached in 1933. hey 
had lost men during the civil war of the 1880s, 
and a lu epidemic in 1905, and the big Paciic 
wide lu epidemic of 1919 severely set back 
their population growth. hus the birth of the 
1,500th Nauruan in October 1933 was a major 
event that is still celebrated annually on the 
Nauruan calendar today. Nauruan autonomy 
has been based around rebuilding the numbers 
of Nauruans and their rights. 
Retarded Development
Views of development as beneits derived from 
a cash economy that would «trickle down» to the 
wider populace have been critiqued by those who 
have witnessed its failures, resulting in widening 
gaps between poor and rich (e.g. Sachs and 
Warner, 2001; Stiglitz, 2006). Instead, views of 
development based on a «bottom up» approach 
stress the need to broaden the development 
concept to include humanitarian concerns, 
such as ready access to basic needs (i.e. assured 
food supplies), to address health and education 
facilities, and most importantly recognition of 
and respect for peoples’ rights to autonomy and 
decision making according to their own values 
(Sen, 2001). Environments can be assessed from 
both standpoints; the Nauruan case, successfully 
heard before the International Court of Justice 
in he Hague, serves as case law that indicates 
that an island community’s environment was 
more than just commercial property for others 
to exploit (Weeramantry, 1992).he hearings 
pointed out that bpc had failed to advance the 
development of Nauru society as entrusted 
to them by the League of Nations Mandate, 
followed by the United Nations Trusteeship.
Cash Dependency
he «wealth» that was so frequently attributed 
to Nauruans during the irst half of the 
xxth century in media reports is a myth, built up 
Given the scarcity of basic resources, and their 
strong attachment to their land, Nauruans had 
devised a social system that organised the best 
means of allocating resources among the resident 
population, including rights to land. Individuals 
inherited rights to named pieces of land through 
both their mothers and fathers, but shared those 
rights with kin. heir class system, as linked to 
a complex chiely system that controlled the 
twelve tribes, and responsibilities to the twelve 
districts persisted despite the administrators 
attempts to apply new means of controlling 
Nauruans, alongside other residents. 
Nauruan leadership emerged to express their 
concerns about injustices. Timothy Detudamo 
expressed their expectations for a greater share 
of the phosphate wealth with bpc throughout 
the 1920a and 1930s, and Hammer de Roburt 
took up his role after Nauruans returned from 
exile in 1946. When Nauruans decided in 
1952 to update their system, they formed the 
Nauru Local Government Council that replaced 
the hierarchy of the class system, with elected 
representation of the people. hat lasted through 
into the 1990s.heir submissions to the United 
Nations Visiting Missions built their case for 
independence; Hammer de Roburt became 
President intermittently from 1970 onwards 
until his death. Nauruans continued to manage 
their afairs according to their own principles, 
despite attempts to impose alternative controls. 
Autonomy persists as all important among those 
principles.
Demographic Imbalance
Nauruans were concerned that their small 
numbers, amounting to 1,084 in 1921, 
contributed to their lack of voice with the 
Australian administrators. hey were vastly 
outnumbered (2:1) by the mining contract 
labour force and mining administrators. 
Reproduction of their tribal groups has been 
an ongoing concern for Nauruans. Given the 
limited resources to feed the population and 
fears that any one tribe may die out, they had set 
in place a cultural system of channelling the best 
food resources to a young woman at menarche 
(Pollock, 1995, 2012). A young woman’s 
fertility was preciously guarded and socially 
supported; a fattening process ensured she had 
the best chance to produce a healthy ofspring 
(Pollock, 1995). Directing scarce resources 
towards successful reproduction was a major 
cultural feature, necessary to support the desired 
increases to the population.
hat concern to increase the Nauruan 
population has been retained throughout the 
xxth century; very few Nauruans have migrated 
away from their island. Population growth has 
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drew attention of successive un Visiting Missions 
to bpc failures to observe those obligations.
Nauruans lost use of their lands in return for a 
very small share of those returns. When mining 
began on plots of land in the south east corner 
of Top Side two or three land holders received 
a few pfennigs per ton initially, then two pence 
per ton of phosphate extracted from her/his 
land after 1922 when the British Phosphate 
Commissioners established control of the island 
and all its resources. 
In contrast at that time the bp Commissioners 
were selling that phosphate to Australia and New 
Zealand at Australian 4 pounds 52 pence per ton 
– many hundred per cent proit. And those were 
mates’ rates! – i.e. below open market rates. As 
Weeramantry has demonstrated (igure 2.1): 
«it is important to note that not only was the Nau-
ruan landowner receiving so minute a fraction of the 
value of the phosphate taken from his land, he was 
also left with the added burden of the devastation of 
his land which had been enjoyed by his people from 
time immemorial.» (Weeramantry, 1992: 23)
In the 1890s, before phosphate was discovered, 
German surveyors had mapped the land 
holdings of Nauruans to provide a record of 
both landholders and the boundaries of their 
pieces of land. he Paciic Phosphate Company, 
and subsequently the British Phosphate 
Commissioners, used that survey record as the 
basis by which mining was moved from land 
holding to adjacent land as the template for 
all successive mining. he mining company 
recorded the amount of phosphate extracted 
in a large folio. Against each numbered and 
named piece of land the tonnage of phosphate, 
and the amount paid was recorded. he two 
or three Nauruans who were acknowledged as 
land owners were paid their 50 pfennig a ton 
initially, later a half penny per ton rising to two 
pence per ton in 1922, together with small sums 
paid to the owners of any coconut trees and 
pandanus trees on that land that were destroyed 
by mining. hat record, kept in a folio volume 
in the Lands oice on Nauru, was computerized 
in Melbourne in the 1990s (author’s ieldnotes). 
It provides a clear record of the very small sums 
that each landholder received at the time when 
lands were irst mined. 
Land holders had to replace their pandanus 
and coconut tree food sources with rice and cans 
purchased from the mining company store, a 
further example of bpc’s total control of life on 
Nauru. Each of two or three land holders of each 
mined plot might be awarded a total of six or ten 
(British) pounds per ton of phosphate extracted; 
that money was a once-only income return from 
that land – nothing more would eventuate after it 
was mined out. hose small sums of cash paid to 
and repeated by those who were more familiar 
with the increased productivity that phosphate 
brought to Australian and New Zealand 
farmers, than with the realities that Nauruans 
were experiencing from outsiders’ mining 
interests. If Nauruans had been receiving their 
rightful share of proits from the sale of their 
phosphate then they might have been wealthy 
in a capitalist sense, even though they had lost 
half the usable living space on their island. 
Dependency has become a high price to pay for 
their resource curse, especially for a population 
highly desirous to maintain their autonomy. he 
rentier economy that overrode Nauruans’ rights 
became their underlying point of contention at 
the Commission of Enquiry into Worked out 
mines in 1986 (Weeramantry, 1992).
he British Phosphate Commissioners, when 
established under the Nauru Island Agreement 
in 1919, had allotted shares among themselves, 
so that Australia and the United Kingdom would 
take 42 % each of the phosphates produced, 
while New Zealand was allotted 16%. As one uk 
politician stated: 
«We lay down in this Agreement the best phos-
phates in the world are to be held for the exclusive 
use of the three nations and in any case are to be sold 
to them at cost.» (cited in Weeramantry, 1992: 62-3)
No mention was made of any payments to 
Nauruans – those were for each Australian 
Administrator to determine later in consultation 
with Canberra (for terms of the Nauru Island 
Agreement 1919, see Weeramantry, 1992, 
Appendix I: 376-378).
his new management of mining replaced the 
structure initially set in place under German 
administration and the Paciic Phosphate 
Company when mining irst began in 1906. 
After World War I when German possessions 
were redistributed under the League of Nations 
Mandate, responsibility for Nauru was assigned 
to the uk, at Australia’s particular behest. 
he status of the mining operation was not 
speciied as a separate entity from development 
of Nauruan afairs. But the Mandate speciied 
under its provisions that the British Empire, 
through the Commissioners «as managers of a 
business concern» was responsible for ensuring: 
«not only the present welfare of the natives, but 
also in conformity with the recommendations of the 
Covenant, the development of the population of the 
mandated area.» (cited in Weeramantry 1991, Ap-
pendix II: 381)
Similar development obligations were set in 
place when Nauru became a United Nations 
Trust Territory after World War II. Nauruans 
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rising to three shillings and six pence just before 
Nauruans declared independence in 1968 
(Viviani, 1970: 189). By that time two thirds of 
all the land holdings on Top Side had been mined, 
and become inaccessible. After independence, 
Nauruans had to consider whether to continue 
mining. hey decided they needed the income.
Nauruans became consumers with no other 
choices. hey had to buy the new goods 
including cloth as missionaries and other 
outsiders expected them to replace their ridi 
made from pandanus leaves by cloth garments. 
he Company store provided an array of goods 
such as Nauruans had never seen before. hey 
were praised for «modernising» by buying items 
as they could aford them. Consumerism was a 
mark of modernisation.
he sums those irst Nauruan land holders 
received were miniscule and hardly constituted 
the label «wealth» as was so oft reported. Rather 
the wealth was accruing to Australian and New 
Zealand farmers as they harvested crops grown 
with the new uncontaminated fertilizer.
Trust Funds
Australian administrators established a Nau-
ru Royalty Trust Fund in 1921 in answer 
to Nauruans’ demands for a greater share 
of the returns from phosphate sales. hose 
administrators decided that since Nauruans were 
unfamiliar with handling money any increases in 
returns should be placed out of reach of everyday 
spending in a Trust Fund; one penny per ton of 
phosphate exported was added to the 2 pence 
return to an individual shareholder of the named 
land from which the phosphate had been taken. 
he proportion of the sums deducted to be paid 
into a Trust Fund was increased over time, almost 
equal to the sum paid direct to landholders as 
discussed above. Two pence in the hand (direct 
payments) was matched by one or two pence in 
the Nauru Royalty Trust Fund on behalf of each 
land holder.
Subsequent Australian administrators increased 
the number of Trust Funds over the 47 years 
between 1920 and 1967. he Nauru Royalty 
Trust Fund, Nauruan Landowners Royalty Trust 
Fund, the Nauruan Community Long Term 
Investment Fund, and a Rehabilitation Fund 
were added over time. Each Fund was invested 
by the Australian administration to set aside 
income for use when the phosphate ran out. 
he sums invested were not apparent to the un 
Visiting Missions in the 1950s and 1960s who 
sought access to the inancial records of the bpc.
In addition Nauruans were charged a 
«management fee» of 10% of costs deducted 
from their phosphate returns (Viviani, 1970: 
160). Administration costs rose from 3,829 
Nauruans had to be used to buy foods to replace 
the pandanus and coconuts that the land holder’s 
household had formerly relied on, together with 
whatever ish they caught as a supplement, 
as well as for all other means of supporting 
themselves, such as housing. Furthermore they 
were culturally bound to share such «luxuries» 
with kin. Rice and tinned meat were purchased 
from the «Company (i.e. bpc)» store at inlated 
prices. When Timothy Detudamo, a Nauruan 
leader, set up an alternative Cooperative store in 
the 1920s for Nauruans, he was thrown in gaol. 
heir holdings were reduced to a sea of calcite 
pinnacles. Phosphate «dirt» was dug out (by 
Chinese contract labourers) from between 
the hard calcite pinnacles to be processed into 
superphosphate before being shipped and sold 
of shore to Australian and New Zealand farmers. 
he high grade fertilizer rapidly increased the 
productivity of their pastures. It was sold to 
them at below market rates.
When the question of whether Nauruans had 
been adequately compensated for loss of their 
land was raised in 1957 and 1960 at meetings 
with the United Nations Trusteeship Council, 
the bpc representative claimed that: 
«there was no world price for phosphate» 
and details of the commercial enterprise were 
conidential [to bpc] and: 
«bore no relation to a Trust Territory.» (cited in 
Weeramantry, 1992: 138)
his argument was used in justiication for bpc’s 
failure to provide the Trusteeship Council with 
full information on their inancial operations 
in regard to Nauru. But Trusteeship Council 
members continued to press for Nauru’s 
accounts, as Nauruans believed that: 
«the Commissioners were making proits at the 
expense of the Nauruans.» (Weeramantry, 1992: 138)
Nauruans’ concerns were at last beginning to 
reach those considering their rights, rather than 
just economic returns.
Nauruans were taking note of the discrepancies 
in cash value, and kept a steady pressure on the 
Australian administrators for bpc from 1921 
onwards to increase returns to land holders. But 
they were stymied by their small numbers and 
lack of «voice». Sums were increased gradually 
from two pence to four pence in 1927 and 
stayed at that rate until 1939, (but one penny 
per ton was deducted to be placed in a Royalty 
Trust Fund, as discussed below). After the mine 
restarted in 1948 following the devastation of 
World War II, Nauruan land holders received 
six pence per ton of phosphate from their land, 
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Mandate and the United Nations Trusteeship. 
hey had to seek advice from outsiders as they 
had previously been totally excluded from any 
management roles in the phosphate industry or 
in administration. heir inancial position has 
posed ongoing major di culties for Nauruans. 
hey were poorly equipped to uncover such a 
complex set of books. An irreversible situation 
continued after independence as the natural 
resource curse has persisted.
he Trust Funds were supposed to provide 
money for the support of future generations. 
Mining advisers to the new Nauru Phosphate 
Corporation in 1970 suggested that the 
remaining third of phosphate reserves would last 
to 1996 at the current rate of mining. he general 
Nauruan population expected their payouts 
from their calculated shares of the Royalty 
Trust Funds, known as Ronron, to be available 
on that date. Some 6,000 of them had plans in 
place for spending the money. When a series 
of governments was unable to provide answers 
to the people as to how much, and when the 
payments would commence, Nauruans staged a 
protest in 1993 at the time the Paciic Islands 
Forum meeting on Nauru. But the Government 
has failed to reveal what happened to the funds. 
In 1997 the United Nations Development 
Programme revised Nauru’s per capita Gross 
National Product from $a29,110 million to 
$a3,711million (quoted in Quanchi, 2007: 
253). Many such igures have been presented 
depending on how blame is apportioned.
he label «failed state» that has been attached to 
Nauru and other Paciic Islands (Brown, 2007), 
has been applied repeatedly by one commentator 
refering to Nauruan failures to safeguard their 
investments for more inancial transparency 
since 1921, and more stridently in the 1950s, 
but to no avail. he state of their inancial afairs 
has challenged many outsiders as well as a series 
of Nauruan governments.
Environmental Degradation
he costs of mining for Nauruans included 
environmental destruction of Top-Side, that 
Australian pounds in 1922 to 862,136 
pounds in 1966 when they comprised 20% 
of the value of phosphate exports in 1966 
as taken from sales of phosphates (Vivian, 
1970). Weeramantry made a key point 
during the later compensation hearings (in 
1988) that: 
«he British Phosphate Commissioners […] 
were endeavouring to purchase the phosphates avai-
lable for the cheapest possible price […][.] It ensured 
that the Nauruans would not receive the best possible 
price for their phosphates.» (Weeramantry, 1992: 104)
Nauruans were thus paying for administration 
of their island under a League of Nations Class 
C Mandate out of their phosphate money. 
he Mandate supposedly protected Nauruan 
interests, but any development was being paid 
for out of Nauruans’ own small returns.
he various Trust Funds were invested by 
Australian accountants with little input from 
Nauruans. Furthermore the inancial records of 
the various funds were so obfuscated that neither 
the League of Nations nor the United Nations 
after them was able to ascertain accurately the 
true position and status of the Nauru accounts. 
Accounts were secret (Weeramantry, 1992: 
105). he Commissioners channelled money 
into a variety of funds, such as a Capital Assets 
Replacement Reserve, the Development Reserve 
and others but the accounts were not revealed 
to either protective agency nor to Nauruans 
themselves. 
he status of their inancial afairs and where 
money had been invested on their behalf became 
a major concern for the newly independent 
Nauru government in 1970. In 1971 they 
had bought the mining equipment from the 
Commissioners for $a21 millions, that they 
distributed «to countries of their choice» 
exclusive of Nauru (Weeramantry, 1992: 282). 
he British Phosphate Commissioners were 
dissolved in 1987. heir records of 47 years of 
administering the mine and the island «were 
not generally available for perusal» to the 
Nauruan established Commission of Inquiry in 
the 1980s (Weeramantry, 1992: 69). he new 
nation was faced with a heavy debt and obscured 
investments on which hopes were pinned.
In 1970 the new Nauru government inherited 
a very murky inancial picture. hey began 
immediately to try to establish their claims for 
underpayments from phosphate and betrayal of 
trust by the British Phosphate Commissioners of 
their responsibilities to develop Nauruan way of 
life under the terms of the League of Nations 
Figure 1. – Phosphate in Nauru (date, picture 
Nancy Pollock)
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for birds migrating across the Paciic. Noddy 
terns circled the island, to take up their places 
in the trees at night. Nauruans captured these 
as a food source. Giant frigate birds favoured 
the shore-line as their roosting sites, where they 
became an important part of Nauruan cultural 
life; Nauruans regarded them as representing the 
ancestors, enticing them on shore with ofers 
of ish, and thence to rest, initially in shore line 
trees. Each tribe maintained frigate bird stands 
on the shoreline to which the birds learned to 
return each night. he stands of birds around the 
island represented the strength of a tribe. As tree 
cover diminished men built frigate bird stands 
on the shoreline from scrap wood. he cult of the 
frigate bird has endured as a key part of Nauruan 
heritage (Kayser, 1935) despite mining activities. 
hey provide the major icon of Nauruan coat of 
arms, and on the tails of Nauru’s leet of planes 
(Pollock, 2009). hey represent Nauruans’ ties 
to their island environment.
Humanitarian Concerns
Nauruans were very aware of their loss of 
autonomy as bpc took control of their island and 
began expressing it through pressure on Australian 
administration oicials. hat autonomy has been 
their underlying premise for establishing their 
rights to claim compensation for underpayments 
as well as welfare injustices and the right to 
expect bpc to rehabilitate their island. Financial 
losses were part of the larger concern for social 
justice for lost humanitarian rights. Nauruans 
considered a key factor to be raising their 
population size – above 1,500 Nauruans – if they 
were to gain back their rights. Autonomy had 
been snatched from them, and compensation 
was necessary. Leadership needed a strong 
backing. Hence after independence in 1968, 
Hammer de Roburt and his government began 
to seek international support for compensation 
claims and the Rehabilitation exercise.
he distribution of wealth from mining was 
an economic concern that included many 
humanitarian concerns. Nauruans brought 
some 30 years of arguments they had been 
formulating before the Commission of Enquiry 
for Rehablitation of Worked out Mines in 1986 
(author’s ieldnotes).2 As Stiglitz has noted for 
the natural resource curse world-wide: 
«the riches that arise from grabbing hold of a nation’s 
natural resources […] undermines faith in the market 
economy – when it is suspected that the wealth 
is acquired “illegitimately” through underhanded 
deals with current or previous governments. It is 
not surprising that discontent seethes beneath the 
surfaces of these countries.» (Stiglitz, 2006: 137) 
comprises four ifths of the interior of the island. 
As a raised reef, that interior stood some 200 feet 
above the coastal strip that marked the shoreline 
above a narrow encircling reef. he lands holding 
the «rich source of phosphate» in Australian 
eyes were degraded piece by piece into a sea of 
pinnacles which beneits no one, and raises the 
temperature of the island environment.
Before mining began, the island was noted 
for its green and pleasant appeal. he trees that 
covered the island were a point of remark by 
early visitors, such as Commander Simpson in 
1843. hey termed Nauru «pleasant island» and 
a Garden of Eden on account of its lush greenery. 
(hey must have visited after a rainy season, as 
Nauru is prone to a range of climates varying 
from heavy downpours to droughts that last 
two or three years.) But the calcareous base to 
the island meant that water is always a precious 
resource. Vegetation that survives these extremes 
is limited in variety, yet for several hundred 
years Nauruans had managed their land so as to 
support a viable population.
After mining, the rich forest was destroyed, 
leading to ever increasing environmental 
damage. he interior became a waste-land. Each 
land holder watched as diggers and machinery 
carried the dirt, called phosphate, to a processing 
plant on the coast line, to be transformed into 
super phosphate, and thence shipped out to 
waiting vessels that carried the valuable cargo 
to Australia and New Zealand. heir land was 
being exported to some distant purchasers, to 
use as superphosphate to improve their lands, 
while degrading Nauruan lands.
he process of degradation of Top Side 
included removal of the two major hillocks 
that were integral to their heritage. hey had 
had strong spiritual meaning to Nauruans as 
they were said to represent the landing places 
of the founding ancestors who arrived from the 
Gilbert Islands several hundred years earlier to 
establish a new community (see Pollock, 2014). 
he early Nauruans had maintained these sites 
with reverence and awe as part of their heritage 
and links to the founding ancestors. Bulldozers 
tore away the soil to stockpile it, regardless of 
Nauruan protests.
Top-Side had been a tree-covered forest that 
provided not only useful materials for building, 
clothing, food and recreation, but the pathways 
that linked the twelve districts that radiated 
from a central point on Top Side. It was a central 
feature of their communication system across 
the island. But the sea of pinnacles makes such 
crossings, and other uses, impassable.
he tree cover protected the island from the 
worst of the heat. Located just ifty miles south 
of the Equator, the heat takes its toll on both 
lora and fauna. Trees such as the giant tomano 
(Calophyllum) had served as the resting place 
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by confusion of the roles of administration of island 
afairs and the role of mining administration, both 
under the aegis of Australia’s Canberra government. 
he demands of development of mining 
outweighed the demands of island development. 
Mining greed pre-empted social developments.
hroughout three quarters of the xxth century, 
Nauruans lost autonomy over their people and their 
land irstly when the Paciic Phosphate Company 
established the phosphate mine on Nauru, and 
latterly when bpc took over responsibilities for 
mining and administration. Nauru had been 
annexed by Germany in 1888 at the request 
of the head chief of Nauru in order to end the 
civil war that was raging throughout the 1880s. 
Establishment of peace was achieved by German 
authorities working through the tribal chiefs. 
Nauruans still maintained their social controls, 
well documented in the detailed ethnographic 
accounts of the time (e.g. Hambruch, 1914; 
Kayser, 1935; Kretzschmar, 1913; Wedgwood, 
1935) until their rights were abrogated by the 
Nauru Island Agreement (1919) that established 
the British Phosphate Commissioners in charge, 
with Australia as chief administrator of the island 
afairs, and of the mine.
Nauruans’ pressure on Administrators from 
1921 onward up to independence in 1968 
expressed their views on how their rights were 
being set aside by bpc interests in proits from 
mining. A series of leaders emerged to maintain 
the pressure, despite the Administrator’s attempts 
to brush them aside. In 1927 the Administrators 
established a Council of Chiefs, consisting of 
twelve selected leaders, one for each district. his 
violated the Nauruan tribal structure, chiely 
hierarchy, and district administration, but under 
the leadership of Timothy Detudamo Nauruans 
gave lip service to administrative proposals, 
while maintaining their own political and class 
structure. 
In 1952, after the disastrous reduction of their 
population during World War II, Nauruans 
established the Nauru Local Government 
Council in order to try to regain some control 
over their own afairs and their lives, and establish 
new less hierarchical leadership channels. Leaders 
emerged in the process of presenting their case 
for their rights to the Australian administrators, 
and to un Trusteeship Visiting Missions. Several 
men such as Timothy Detudamo who bridged 
both traditional and modern state of afairs, and 
Pastor Jacob Aroi took on the task of confronting 
the administration continuously with various 
In Nauru’s case that discontent was expressed by 
concerted eforts to gain independence in 1968. 
Subsequently, this led to a Commission of Enquiry 
for Rehabilitation of Worked out Mines in 1986. 
he key indings provided the basis for the case 
brought before the International Court of Justice in 
he Hague by Professor Weeramantry on Nauru’s 
behalf (see Weeramantry, 1992 for his arguments).
Exclusion from any decision making regarding 
the direction of «developments», allocation 
of the proits from mining, compensation 
for destruction of land, and consideration of 
Nauruans’ rights have been at the forefront of 
Nauruans’ struggles for rectiication of the curse 
of their natural resource. Loss of autonomy has 
been the major platform for emerging leaders, 
representing a growing population, and an 
increasing awareness of the developments denied 
to them.
Loss of Autonomy
he Nauru Island Agreement (1919) did 
not include Nauruans in any of its ifteen 
articles. Rather it set out the powers of the 
three governments, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand as the British 
Phosphate Commissioners to «make provision 
for mining of the phosphate deposits on the 
said Island»(Preamble), «under the direction, 
management and control of the Commissioners» 
(Article 8). he most contentious point was 
stated in Article 6: 
«he title to the phosphate deposits on the Island 
of Nauru and to all land, buildings, plant and equip-
ment on the island used in connexion with the wor-
king of the deposits shall be vested in the Commis-
sioners.» (Article 6) 
Nauruan rights to their island were totally set aside.
he Nauru Island Agreement pre-empted the 
terms by which the island was to be administered 
under the newly created 1920 League of Nations 
Mandate following the end of World War 
I. Under Article 22 of that Mandate proper 
discharge of mandate responsibilities required:
«there should be applied the principle that the well-
being and development of such peoples [to which the 
Mandate applied] form a sacred trust of civilisation.» 
he uk Commissioner reminded the other 
Commissioners from time to time that they had 
a development commitment, but this was set aside 
2.  he Commission of Enquiry into Worked out Mines was set up by President Hammer de Roburt, in conjunction 
with AusAid, Canberra, in 1983. he team of 17 consisted of 15 Australian experts, Lagi Harris representing the Nauru 
Government and myself, anthropologist, a New Zealand/British female. My role was to liaise with Lagi Harris to seek 
out the wishes of the Nauru people. He and I conducted consultative meetings in the twelve districts, and Lagi was 
formulating a video to explain the options for rehabilitation, but unfortunately he died before it was completed.
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and the whole afair was brought to the attention 
of the irst United Nations Trusteeship Visiting 
Mission in 1952. he outside world gradually 
became aware of some of the non-development 
that Nauruans had been experiencing.
he Nauruan population has grown to over 
9,000 at the start of the xxist century (2002 
census). Until 2006 mining had continued to 
draw on contract workers who resided on the 
island during the terms of their contract. 4,000 
mainly iKiribati (Gilbertese) were sent home in 
2006 as mining diminished. But in 2008, and 
again in 2012, Australia made arrangements for 
their unwanted «boat people» from various parts 
of Asia to be established in a refugee camp on 
Nauru, until Australia sorted out their futures. 
hese 4,000 outsiders have placed a heavy drain on 
Nauru’s local resources (Pollock, 1998). Nauruans 
have ceded some autonomy in return for much 
needed government assistance from Australia.
Welfare Issues
In 1920 responsibility for Nauruan welfare 
was mandated to bpc in general, and Australia 
in particular, to be superseded later by the 
United Nations Trusteeship arrangements. 
Developments that should assist Nauru to 
improve their well-being were a major entailment 
for the three nations’ commissioners. But these 
were largely sublimated by Australian focus on 
mining proits. Any developments, such as health 
care, education, political and administrative 
skills, and housing were introduced for all 
residents of the island. Nauruans failed to receive 
any speciic beneits. Yet the bills for ever rising 
costs of Administration were paid for out of 
Nauruan phosphate money. 
he Australian administration established a 
hospital for Nauruans, together with a separate 
hospital for non-Nauruans. Primary schools 
were established around the island to educate 
both Nauruans and the children of the contract 
labour force, mainly Gilbertese children. A long 
apartment building known as the Gilbertese 
settlement was erected on the south west 
shoreline, to house Gilbertese families, and 
some Ellice island workers. Later residences for 
Filipino and other contract staf were all paid for 
out of the Administration fund. Administrative 
staf were housed in more modern buildings, set 
above the shore-line. 
Roads, and other amenities, as well as a police 
force, a gaol, and other «developments» were 
all paid for out of the Nauruan Administrative 
fund. Bpc bore the costs of the new technology, 
including a rail system, a storage system for 
processed super phosphate, and the cantilever 
and mooring systems that enabled ships to load 
ships direct from shore into ships’ holds.
aspects of their case both for greater inancial 
returns and for more social improvements.
Led by a number of able educated Nauruans, 
who were learning more about their rights 
under the development criteria of the League 
of Nations, then the United Nations, the nlgc 
collated their case to a series of un Visiting 
Missions in 1950s and 1960s. hey voiced their 
strong desire for assistance with clariication of 
the inancial afairs of the administration and 
the mine, and to reject Australia’s attempts 
to move them of their island in 1960s. hese 
concerns paved the way for the concerted claim 
for «damages under international trusteeship» 
against the British Phosphate Commissioners 
and Australia in particular, as discussed below.
After independence under Hammer de Roburt’s 
leadership, Nauruans formulated their plans to 
obtain redress for past injustices by the bpc; that 
was the key issue at the centre of the Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry on the Rehabilitation of 
Worked out Phosphate lands on Nauru, 1988. 
Nauruans had long been concerned that their 
land was being taken without their agreement, 
and the many injustices they had endured. But 
they had lacked support for case until members 
of the visiting missions of the un Trusteeship 
Council assisted their case. Nauruans struggle 
earned them their independence in 1968.
Nauruans were outnumbered on their island 
by imported labour for the irst half of the 
xxth century. Of the 1,000 Nauruans living on 
their island when mining began in 1906, the 
men chose not to work in the mines, because 
they did not have the skills, nor the desire for that 
“work”. he Paciic Phosphate Company began 
importing labour from China and various parts 
of the Paciic, particularly Gilbert Islands (now 
Kiribati) as the main manpower that became 
essential to keep the mine operating (Ellis, 
1935). Contract worker numbers exceeded the 
total number of Nauruans through to the 1950s.
Nauruan population growth sufered major 
setbacks during World War II when 1,200, i.e. 
two thirds of the Nauruan population, was exiled 
to Truk/Chuuk by the occupying Japanese force, 
resulting in many deaths; only 487 Nauruans 
returned home in 1946 to join those left on 
Nauru to work for the Japanese. hey faced a 
major rebuilding exercise. Destruction of the 
island had been further exacerbated by American 
bombing of Japanese military installations across 
the island (Pollock, 1998). After the War the 
British Phosphate Commissioners’ eagerness 
to restart mining operations placed strong 
emphasis on rebuilding their labour force, and 
humanitarian support for them. Housing became 
a contentious issue as the bpc administration 
built new housing for the new contract labour 
force, while Nauruans’ own housing needs were 
overlooked. his dispute led to racial lare ups, 
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proportion of Nauruans’ funds was allocated 
only partially alleviated those concerns. After 
independence in 1970, and Nauruan purchase 
of mining assets for $21 million, Hammer de 
Roburt and government oicials began concerted 
eforts to address their right to compensation 
for loss of income from phosphate sales, and 
to rectify the destruction of Top Side. Upon 
completion of that purchase, as Weeramantry 
argued the Nauruan case: 
«the Commissioners had a clear obligation under 
international law to give back to the Nauruans capital 
assets bought with phosphate moneys. Instead they 
sold the assets on the ground to the Nauruans […] 
ignored the beneits they had collected in the form of 
capital assets overseas, and inally when the oice of 
the British Phosphate Commissioners ceased to exist 
[in 1987] appropriated those assets into the treasuries 
of the partner governments, to be distributed from 
that source as largesse to other countries with no 
reference whatever to the Nauruans.» (Weeramantry, 
192: 272)
Furthermore the Commissioners ignored 
Nauruans’ requests to desist from distributing 
those assets until the situation was clariied by 
the work of the Commission of Enquiry. 
he Commission of Enquiry into the Worked 
out Mines on Nauru, as proposed by the Nauru 
government in 1984, established a platform for 
their formal complaint. Since independence, 
Hammer de Roburt and other Nauruan 
leaders realised much information was missing, 
including all statements of inancial transactions 
since 1921, but vital if they were to formulate 
a strong case for restitution of their rights. he 
Commission of Enquiry produced a series of 
recommendations from various outside experts 
for the future of the island (Commission for 
Rehabilitation of Worked Out Mines on Nauru, 
1996). Funded jointly by Australian Aid and the 
Nauru government the Commission’s work and 
inal report has been maintained under strict 
control by the Nauru government.
hat Commission of Enquiry drew on advice 
from 17 experts including a geologist, an 
engineer, a calcite expert, a housing advisor, 
botanists and post-mining assessors and a social 
anthropologist to liaise with a senior Nauru 
government representative. Recommendations 
included assessment of the feasibility of cutting 
down the pinnacles to re-construct a lat surface 
on Top Side, relocation of the airport and 
other amenities to that newly lattened area, 
thereby releasing considerable acreage on the 
lat southeast coastline for future residential 
developments. Women wanted new housing 
«Toorak style» provided along the edge of 
Top Side, while a class of one Primary School 
overwhelmingly favoured a «park» amongst trees 
on Top Side with trees, play equipment and 
By 1966, when Nauruans were strongly 
pushing for independence, Administration costs 
had risen to almost 100,000 Australian pounds; 
that represented 20% of the value of phosphate 
exports at that time (Viviani, 1970: Table 11, 
190-191). Nauruans shares in «developments» 
with all other temporary residents on the island 
brought few advantages of modernisation. hey 
had no say in how money was allocated, but 
became reliant on a consumer economy.
he health of Nauruans was reported annually, 
including those with leprosy, and other infectious 
diseases. By 1980 the numbers of Nauruans 
with high rates of Body Mass Index (bmi) led 
an epidemiologist team to declare an «obesity 
epidemic» which drew much media attention 
(e.g. Zimmet et al., 1977). he medical team 
attributed the obesity to consumption of large 
amounts of junk food as a result of the so-called 
«wealth» from phosphate mining (Zimmet et al., 
1977). he Obesity label has persisted; World 
Health Organization placed Nauru at the top 
of their 2002 ranking of 170 nations worldwide 
according to their rates of bmi. he direct links 
drawn between increased wealth, poor food 
choices and obesity do not consider pre-cursive 
events. he need to preplace pandanus, coconuts 
and ish with store bought foods, but limited 
cash, was a necessary consequence of mining; 
choices of foods were limited. Nauruan cultural 
fattening of young women pre-mining may 
have lingering genetic implications. Obesity 
and high rates of bmis provide a further example 
of the long-term negative impact of mining 
exploitation on creating a state of dependency. 
It is a direct outcome of the long term negative 
impact of mining (Pollock, 1995, 2012).
Nauruans responded strongly to Australian 
manoeuvrings in the early 1960s to take them 
of their island and relocate them to share Curtis 
Island of the north east Australian Coast with 
another population. Australia could then mine 
the rest of the phosphate with contract labour for 
their own proits, without any «development» 
concerns for Nauruans. he Nauru Local 
Government Council expressed their very strong 
opposition to this move to Visiting Missions from 
the un Trusteeship Council, winning the backing 
of members of those Missions. Nauruans were 
concerned to hold on to their island at all costs. 
Such suggestions only hardened their resolve to 
gain independence, and as soon as possible.
Rehabilitation of the Island Environment
Nauruans’ concerns for the future of their 
island that began in the 1920s and 1930s, was 
expressed in poetry, as well as in representations 
to successive administrators. Establishment of a 
Rehabilitation Trust Fund, into which a small 
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Commissioners. Trust in outside management/
administration had been thoroughly undermined 
as they began to discover, post-independence, 
just how actively the «curse» of phosphate had 
diminished their chances for a future after 
mining. Degradation of their island environment 
resulted in a major loss that is proving very 
costly and di cult to rectify 50 years later. 
he Commission of Enquiry into Worked Out 
Mining areas provided some pointers, but all have 
proved very costly and impractical according to 
Nauruan values. Successive governments have 
yet to ind a solution. Political instability tied to 
a murky inancial stability is the legacy (Stiglitz, 
2006: 136).
Nauru’s litany of woes attributed to the 
natural resource curse extend beyond the early 
mis-representations of Nauruans as «wealthy» 
in inancial terms to the failure of phosphate 
mining to advance their welfare and well-being, 
and a new label as a «failed state». hose woes 
continue to exist as successive governments are 
charged with inding a solution. Nauruans cling 
to their island as their homeland, while seeking 
advice that is acceptable to their own values.
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